



It is a great pleasure and honor to be asked to comment on pa-
pers by Professors David Baldus and Bill Bowers and their collabora-
tors.' Professors Baldus and Bowers are two of the most important
and influential researchers on issues of race and capital sentencing,
and I have long admired their work. I thank the University of Pennsyl-
vania Journal of Constitutional Law for giving me this opportunity, and
for organizing such an interesting and provocative symposium.
I must say, my first impression on reading the results of the two
studies presented at the symposium was a profound lack of surprise.
The studies document phenomena that as a lawyer I always assumed
and that as an academic I always feared to be true. Of course, as my
co-commentator Professor Sam Gross aptly noted, sometimes "what
everybody knows" turns out to be completely false. But in this case,
the studies reported by Professors Baldus and Bowers have painstak-
ingly documented some painful pieces of received wisdom. Professor
Bowers's study-part of the valuable work done by the Capital Jury
Project-tells us that black and white jurors often vote differently
from one another in capital sentencing, and that this effect is most
pronounced in cases involving black defendants and white victims.!
Given that black and white Americans vote differently in politics and
on polls of just about every stripe,3 this racial divide in the highly
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charged arena of cross-racial capital trials is hardly surprising.' Pro-
fessor Baldus's study is similarly unsurprising in its results. Professor
Baldus reports that prosecutors and defense lawyers (accurately) per-
ceive the very sort of racial divisions that the Bowers study docu-
ments, and that they use their peremptory challenges accordingly?
Also unsurprising is the Baldus study's conclusion that the Supreme
Court's attempt to prohibit racial and gender-based discrimination in
the use of peremptory strikes has had some-but only quite modest-
impact on lawyers' behavior, given the lawyers' perceived incentives
and their likelihood of actually being sanctioned for violations." Less
widely anticipated-indeed, perhaps entirely unanticipated-is Pro-
fessor Baldus's documentation of the comparative advantage that
prosecutors have in jurisdictions like Philadelphia, where the "prime
targets" for prosecutorial use of peremptory strikes are considerably
smaller in number than the "prime targets" for defense perempto-
ries.7 This disparity in peremptory power leads Baldus and his col-
leagues to consider a number of reforms to the law and practice re-
garding peremptory strikes."
Not being an empirical researcher or statistician myself, I %ill not
attempt to analyze or comment upon the research methodology of
the two studies; rather, I will turn my attention to the legal implica-
tions of the studies' findings, assuming their validity. What should
the law's response be to studies of this kind? What should we do?
One obvious way to go-and, indeed, Professor Baldus explicitly
leads us there-is to think about how to structure the jury selection
process so as to preserve, insofar as possible, the representativeness of
the resultingjury. Professor Baldus considers reforms of the law and
practice of peremptory strikes that are geared toward minimizing or
preventing the skewing of capital juries away from minority represen-
tation in jurisdictions such as Philadelphia.' Presumably, Professor
Bowers would applaud such efforts as well, given his study's finding of
the effect of black jurors on outcomes in capital trials, particularly
those involving inter-racial murders.'Y This focus on restructuring
jury selection is quite natural and sensible. After all, our commit-
ment to juries rather than judges-for criminal trials in general, and
cept Trumps Pradiue, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1999, at A4 (Opinion Research Corp. International
poll showing that blacks and whites differed on value of diversity); John L Mitchell & Sandy
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borly Refses to Close Diverse Readions Refltr Issues' Painful Complemzt. L_. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1997,
at Al (Gallup poll revealing large racial divide in perceptions of OJ. Simpson's guilt or inno-
cence in the murder case in which he was acquitted).
4 See, eg., Baldus et. al., supra note 1, at 52.
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7 Id at 57-60.
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for capital sentencing in particular-arises at least in part from the
capacity of multi-memberjuries to represent the community through
their very plurality in a way that a single judge necessarily cannot.
Thus, one important project a reformer might initiate in light of the
results of the Bowers and Baldus studies is an attempt, through law, to
prevent jury composition from being systematically skewed away from
minority representation.
Indeed, a great deal of the legal literature on race and criminal
justice focuses on this or related questions already. Many academics,
judges, and policy-makers have debated whether peremptory strikes
ought to be eliminated entirely, as Justice Thurgood Marshall sug-
gested in his concurrence in Batson v. Kentucky." Others have focused
on the inefficacy of Batson in combating intentional racial discrimina-
tion in the use of peremptory challenges; they suggest additional or
alternative remedies, such as more stringent self-imposed ethical
standards for prosecutors and trial court judges2 or peremptory chal-
lenges that are "blind" to race and based on written instead of live
voir dire.' 3 Still others have urged the revitalization of the Sixth
Amendment's "fair cross-section" requirement as an important addi-
tion to the Equal Protection Clause to combat racial discrimination in
jury selection. 4 Yet others have urged that we more fundamentally
rethink jury selection practices; they suggest various affirmative
schemes to promote diverse representation rather than merely to
combat racial discrimination. 5 These representation-preserving and
representation-forcing projects are worthy of serious attention pre-
cisely because of our hope and belief that it is the representativeness
of juries-at least in part-that makes them better decision-makers
than judges in criminal cases.
But it would be a mistake if these projects became the sole legal
n Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1986) (Marshall,J., concurring); see also Baldus et
al., supra note 1 at 33 n.11.Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial Court Judges, 73 CtI.-KENT L.
REk,. 475 (1998).
13 Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by Questionnaire
and the "Blind"Peremptoiy 29 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 981 (1996).
14 Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error, Jury Representation, and the Sixth
Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93 (1996); Mitchell S. Zuklie, Comment, Rethinking the Fair Cross-Section
Requirement, 84 CAL. L. REv. 101 (1996).
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tion, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353, 382-88 (1999) (suggesting ajury selection process drawn from elec-
toral districting law, whereby representation would be mandated from smaller "jural districts"
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L. REV. 707, 760-76 (1993) (supporting some forms of race-conscious jury selection proce-
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whereby each party to a criminal case would be able to use "affirmative" peremptories to in-
clude a certain number of already qualified jurors on the jury panel, which would then be sub-
ject to a smaller number of traditional peremptory challenges from each side).
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strategy inspired by the work of Professors Baldus and Bowers, for a
number of reasons. First, even in the worlds dreamed about by many
of the jury representation reformers, it will not always be possible to
achieve the optimal representation they envision. After all, jury dis-
tricts are not always particularly diverse themselves, and the luck of
the venire will sometimes create anomalies even in diverse districts,
even in the complete absence of systematic skewing of the pool or in-
tentional discrimination in the selection process. Moreover, it is not
by any means evident that representation that "looks like the jury dis-
trict" or "looks like America" will be representation that has much ef-
fect on verdicts, given the "dominance effects" observed in Professor
Bowers's study. 6 Finally, jury representativeness, even when achieved,
is merely a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for deliberation
informed by the airing of diverse views. As Professor Bowers's quali-
tative data show, minority voices may be overwhelmed in the heated
context of capital trials, or racial tensions may lead jurors to feel con-
firmed in their own pre-existing stereotypes of jurors of other races.
So representation-preserving and representation-forcing legal strate-
gies have their limits as methods for promoting the distinctive bene-
fits ofjury decision-making in capital trials.
Despite these limits, considerably less of the legal literature ex-
plores strategies beyond representation to deal with the issues raised
by observed "race effects" in capital jury decision-making. I want to
use this opportunity to begin a discussion about what alternative
strategies we might imagine-not only because of the limits of repre-
sentation as a means of promoting fairer decision-making, but also
because representation is not the only point ofjuries in either criminal
trials or capital sentencings. Our commitment to juries stems not
only from what jurors, in their representational capacity, can bring to
the decision-making process, but also from what we hope they, the
jurors, will take from it. Alexis de Tocqueville, one of the most per-
ceptive nineteenth-century analysts of the relatively new institutions
of the fledgling American republic, saw that the American jury was
"above all, a political institution" that "raises the people itself, or at
least a class of citizens, to the bench of judges" and "invests the peo-
ple, or that class of citizens, with the direction of society." 7 This cru-
cial aspect of the jury--its relationship to the ideal of self-
government-makes it a means as well as an end in itself. As
Tocqueville realized, the jury "may be regarded as a gratuitous public
school, ever open, in which every juror learns his rights,"' because
the jury, "which is the most energetic means of making the people
rule, is also the most efficacious means of teaching it how to rule
16 Bowers, supm note 1, at 192-201.
17 1 ALEXIS DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN A.\tERicQ 293 (Francis Bowen trans. 1862) (Phil-
lips Bradley ed., Vintage Books 1945) (1835).
is Id at 296.
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well." 9 Tocqueville's observations remain pertinent today: jury serv-
ice is one of the primary lessons in self-governance that our public in-
stitutions offer. Moreover, in our increasingly diverse polity, jury tri-
als are one of the few opportunities for people from different races
and classes to come together and interact as equal participants in a
meaningful project.
What can we do to better educate our jurors in this free public
school that is the jury--not only so that they will do a betterjob at the
task at hand (here, the crucial job of capital sentencing), but also so
that they will bring something other than deepened racial hostility
away from the jury room?
This is no easy task, and there is no simple solution to the prob-
lem of racial polarization in jury deliberations, particularly with re-
gard to capital sentencing. But we are not without options. Con-
sider, as an analogy, the use of expert testimony and cautionary jury
instructions on the issue of the reliability of cross-racial eyewitness
identifications. The work of researchers like Elizabeth Loftus has
demonstrated that despite the high confidence eyewitnesses have in
their identifications, cross-racial identifications as a class are less reli-
able than same-race identifications. 0 As a result, courts often permit
the introduction of expert testimony to combat the natural confi-
dence in, and reliance upon, cross-racial identifications by juries in
criminal cases. In some jurisdictions, such as my home state of Mas-
sachusetts, trial judges have discretion to give cautionary instructions
on the unreliability of cross-racial identifications, even in the absence
of expert testimony.' These legal strategies are meant to correct ju-
rors' misperceptions about the meaning of certain evidence and thus
to prevent miscarriages ofjustice.
What can we learn about capital trials from these cross-racial eye-
witness identification strategies? In the capital sentencing context,
we want to undermine jurors' confidence not in the meaning of cer-
tain evidence, but rather in their own perceptions and judgments,
which are inevitably and powerfully shaped by their race. We want
and need to have jurors searchingly examine and question their own
presuppositions about the world and open their minds to listen to the
alternative assumptions that likely also inhabit the jury room. Some
capital sentencing schemes-like the federal death penalty statute-
seek to defeat racial polarization in capital sentencing by asking each
juror to certify that his or her final determination is not based on the
"race, color, religious beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant
19 Id. at 297.
20 See generally RobertJ. Hallisey, Expert Eyewitness Testimony in Court-A Short Historical Perspec-
tive, 39 HOw. L.J. 237, 245-47 (1995).
21 Commonwealth v. Hyatt, 647 N.E.2d 1168, 1171 (Mass. 1995) (explicitly acknowledging
trial judges' discretion to give cautionary instructions on the unreliability of cross-racial identifi-




or the victim. "2' But such certifications are likely extremely ineffec-
tual, because it seems probable that many of our deepest and most
powerful racially influenced presuppositions are not the products of
conscious thought, but rather habits developed over a lifetime. A
better way to seek to upset or call into question such presuppositions
might be the introduction of expert testimony on the general effects
of juror race on capital sentencing combined ith strong cautionary
instructions from the trial judge.
It is not enough, however, for judges to exhort jurors to set aside
their racial presuppositions, because jurors may very well be unau-are
of what, exactly, those presuppositions might be. I therefore urge de-
fense lawyers to request and trial judges, at least in inter-racial capital
cases, to give instructions that ask jurors to do a "race-sitching" ex-
ercise-that is, to imagine their evaluation of the evidence if the races
of the defendant and the victim were reversed. This exercise, it must
be warned, is not meant to suggest that whatever result the jurors
would reach in the switched-race context is an) more correct, or free
from racial presuppositions, than their initial judgment. Rather, the
exercise is meant to get each juror to reflect upon and to encourage
his or her colleagues to reflect upon the role of race in their percep-
tions of the world. The idea behind such an instruction is that it is
impossible to remove race and its influence upon jurors' perceptions
from the jury room; the best we can hope for is that jury service will
be a means for jurors to grapple sincerely with their own limited per-
spectives and to attempt to open themselves up to new ones. I am
emboldened in this project by some of the data from Professor Bow-
ers's study, data that reveal that although there is great racial polari-
zation through the trial and the first vote on sentencing, there is also
tremendous movement by both white and black jurors during sen-
tencing deliberations, so that the final results are much less polarized
than any of the votes that came before.s Something is happening
during deliberation, and it is that fragile process that my suggestion
seeks to nurture.
A model instruction might sound something like the folloing:
Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, as you heard in evidence at trial [if
there was expert testimony admitted], studies have showvn what you might
have suspected in your hearts to be true: race plays a role in how jurors
perceive evidence and how they vote in capital sentencing hearings, both
their own race and the race of the defendants and %ictims in the cases be-
21 U.S.C. § 848(o)(1).
Bowers, supra note 1, at 197-98 tbl. 2. The data show that at the most racially polarized
point of the capital process--the first vote on punishment-67.3% of %vhitejurors favored death
as compared to only 8.6% of blackjurors. Conversely, at the same point. 71.4% of blackjurors
favored life, as compared to only 26.9% ofwhitejurors. At the final vote on punishment. how-
ever, white jurors for death had dropped to only 41.8% and black jurors for death had risen to
30.6%, whereas blackjurors for life had dropped to 69.4, while white jurors for life had risen
dramatically (more than doubled) to 58.2%.
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fore them.
You may well believe that this is not true of you, because you sincerely
find your heart free of overt racial hatred or bias. But our race and the
road upon which it takes us in the world necessarily affects us in ways that
we cannot completely see or know.
You have sworn to decide the case before you without fear or favor. In
order to help you to do this, I ask you collectively to perform an exercise
in the jury room. I ask each of you to imagine your reaction to the evi-
dence presented in this case if the races of the defendant and the victim
were reversed. I do not ask you to do this in order to suggest to you that
your decision under the conditions of the exercise is any more correct
than your decision under the conditions as they actually exist. Rather, I
ask you to perform this exercise in order to encourage you to reflect
upon-and to urge the other members of the jury to reflect upon-the
effect of race upon your perceptions of the evidence before you.
I ask each of you to listen carefully and respectfully to each other's views,
particularly the views ofjurors whose race is different from your own. If
there are no jurors whose race is different from your own on the jury, try
as best you can to imagine what such ajuror might say to you.
It is my hope that this exercise will help you return a verdict in which you
can confidently assert that racial bias-either conscious or unconscious-
plays no part.
More than fifty years ago, Jerome Frank called prejudice "the thir-
teenth juror."24 Today, in light of the important work of empirical re-
searchers like Professors Baldus and Bowers, we can see that race is
often the thirteenth juror, silent and invisible at the table of delibera-
tions. Minority representation on juries alone is not enough to pro-
mote the crucial ends of jury participation in capital sentencing.
Rather, we need to tear away the silence and invisibility surrounding
the issue of race and force our juries to confront it head on. This is
no magic bullet; there is no guarantee that such confrontations will
reduce, as opposed to exacerbate, existing racial tensions and polari-
zation. But the legal instructions that jurors receive, as Tocqueville
evocatively explained, are part of their rare and valuable tutelage in
self-government as a diverse people. Such instruction may just be our
best hope for racial justice-not just in capital sentencing, but out-
side the jury room as well.
24 United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 659 (2d Cir. 1946) (FrankJ, dis-
senting) ("A keen observer has said that 'next to perjury, prejudice is the main cause of miscar-
riages of justice.' If government counsel in a criminal suit is allowed to inflame the jurors by
irrelevantly arousing their deepest prejudices, the jury may become in his hands a lethal
weapon directed against defendants who may be innocent. He should not be permitted to
summon that thirteenth juror, prejudice.") (footnotes omitted).
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